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Abstract
What does evaluation mean? This paper studies the evaluative process as a
practical judgment that links a situation to a set of values in order to decide
upon a course of action. In the first part, the article follows Sen’s account of
an evaluative process. His critique of the monist, deductive and idealist theory
of Rawls leads to a “relational” and “comparative” approach of the evaluation.
Incompletedness, comparison, reality and deliberation are the key principles
of this methodology. This is close to insights of John Dewey. Nevertheless,
Dewey grasps the pragmatic dimension of the process more precisely then Sen.
He firstly makes the distinction between prizing and appraisal, valuation and
evaluation. And secondly, the singular situation is underlined as a component
of any evaluation. Therefore, evaluation requires empirical inquiry and public
deliberation. In a third step, the article focuses on the relationship between
evaluation and norms in practical judgments. As e...
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Abstract What does evaluation mean? This article examines the evaluative pro-
cess as a practical judgment that links a situation to a set of values in order to decide
upon a course of action. It starts by discussing A. Sen’s ‘‘relational’’ and ‘‘com-
parative’’ account of evaluation, built in critical dialogue with J. Rawls’ deductive
theory. Comparison, incompleteness, reality, and deliberation are the key principles
of Sen’s approach, which, in some respects, echoes that of J. Dewey. The second
part shows the relevance of completing Sen’s approach with Dewey’s pragmatism,
since Dewey’s emphasis on practical judgment is a useful counterbalance to Sen’s
focus on evaluation as a cognitive process. Dewey introduces a shift from values to
valuation and draws a distinction between prizing and appraising, which makes the
logic of inquiry and the search for consistency between means and ends in a given
situation the fulcrum of evaluation. The third part of this paper addresses the
relationship between values and norms in evaluative processes. Neither Sen nor
Dewey deals with this question in a systematic way, although norms, which are both
similar and different from values, contribute to frame evaluations in different ways:
as horizons, resources, or constrains. Bringing norms into the picture means com-
pleting the pragmatist account with an institutionalist perspective, as we suggest
through the example of the evaluation of work.
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Introduction
What does evaluating mean? This question has taken on crucial importance in
contemporary debate. From the 1960s to the 1990s, sociology largely ignored the
question of values; today, however, normative interrogations have returned full-
force. They have been spurred by advances in the fields of political and moral
philosophy, which have revisited questions of justice and goodness with renewed
energy in the past 40 years. These interrogations have also been buoyed by a
reevaluation of the social sciences’ critical stance and a renewed interest in the
analysis of action. This renewed interest in critic and the analysis of action raises the
question of normative action, and, more broadly, of the links between action and
values. How are values manifested through action? How to think about the
relationship between general values on the one hand and individual values on the
other? Are values norms? These questions remain largely disputed and unanswered
in contemporary social sciences.
The resurgence of these theoretical questions has occurred in conjunction with
the development of public and private governance methods that, to an ever-
increasing degree, are placing evaluation processes at the center of their approach.
Post-industrial firms have made the evaluation of work one of the cornerstones of
reforms intended to conjoin fairness and efficiency. This has become a great
preoccupation in public policy, as well, where new evaluative tools are developed in
the name of new public management. In both arenas, experts are consulted to build
tools for empirical exploration and instruments that measure the value of
accomplishments. A ‘‘discipline’’ of evaluation, often with fairly scant theoretical
foundations, but highly prized for its usability, is being put together in a variety of
sectors. It mobilizes practitioners, consultants, and experts, and generates intense
polemic over the question of what evaluating means.
Despite the current fashion for evaluation, it has remained under-theorized in
contemporary thought. Most often, this has resulted in the reduction of evaluation to
one or several of its parts, which are selected with a precise operational goal in
mind, but with little or no regard for its complexity. Only a more systematic and
more theoretical approach can make up for this shortfall. It will help providing
answers both to the practical issues raised by the growing ‘‘discipline’’ of evaluation
and to the theoretical questions it addresses to the social sciences. With this goal in
mind, this article will defend a pragmatist approach to evaluation. The pragmatist
tradition places practical judgment at the heart of its epistemology and its social
theory. As opposed to theoretical judgment, practical judgment is characterized by a
particular type of object: it bears on things to do or to be done in relation to a given
situation (Dewey 1916). Understood in this way, practical judgment is an act of
evaluation in that it links a given situation to values in order to decide upon a course
of action. This is a very ordinary skill: all actors are called upon to make practical
judgments. But it may also be understood as an expert competence in situations
where evaluation is equipped with systematically elaborated concepts and supported
by empirical evidence collected according to specific methodology and tools.
What can be inferred about evaluative judgment from this definition? We will
open our discussion by examining the epistemology of evaluation proposed by
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Amartya Sen, whose work has the unusual merit, in contemporary social sciences,
of explicitly problematizing the basic principles of evaluative science. Sen invites us
to avoid the limitations of deductive philosophy without sacrificing a normative
approach to values (involving justice, freedom, well-being, etc.). His approach
follows four guiding principles: the diversity of evaluations rather than their
reduction to a single hierarchy of values; the incompleteness of evaluations;
attention to accomplishments; and the importance of deliberation. These four
principles provide an alternative to the monist and idealist theory of evaluation put
forward by numerous philosophers, notably John Rawls.
Sen paves the way to a pluralistic and realistic theory of evaluation. But he does
not say much about the constitution of the values that underlie evaluation and the
way they fuel situated agency. In order to answer these questions, we turn to John
Dewey’s theory of valuation. Sen’s proposals for evaluation will then be completed
and put into perspective by the pragmatist distinction between prizing and appraisal
to show how spontaneous valuations that occur in situ may be differentiated from
evaluations that suppose comparisons, measurements, and recourse to generality.
The epistemological principles advanced by Sen will thus be rooted in a theory of
practical judgment based on inquiry. Whether individual or collective, evaluation
implies a continual back-and-forth between ends and means, values and facts,
attachment and distancing.
But what about norms? How do processes of evaluation relate to the production
of norms? Neither Sen nor Dewey thoroughly discuss this question which will be
examined in the third part of this article. Values have been opposed to norms, or
supplanted by them, in sociological theory. Nothing, however, requires us to reduce
the desirable (the value) to the obligatory (the norm), nor to affirm the primacy of
one over the other. Values and norms have different functions in social
coordination.
We will therefore defend the idea that norms and values are complementary. On
the one hand, evaluations may lead to collective norms (in the case of a legislator,
for example) or to individual ones (in life choices, for instance). But how can norms
emerge in a context of plurality of values? The ideas of the partial overlapping of
evaluative spaces and of incomplete judgments both deserve to be explored with
regard to this question. On the other hand, norms are an ingredient in evaluation.
They qualify and condition the situations dealt with in evaluations. In this sense,
they may be considered as cognitive supports to valuation processes.
To conclude, we shall use the case of work evaluation to show how all of these
facets of practical judgment must be taken into account in an evaluation process.
Norms count as much as values, and their relation to one another is a dynamic one.
But, in the end, neither values nor norms are sufficient to account for action in situ.
Neither of them can assure the relevance of practical judgment. Relevance is rather
a matter of ‘‘action that fits’’ (The´venot 1990) or ‘‘creative design’’ (Joas 2000: 170)
to account for the relationship an actor develops with a specific and incomplete
situation. Because of the inexhaustible contingency of action situations, practical
judgment involves singularity and situatedness.
Evaluation as Practical Judgment
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Epistemologies of Evaluation
Sen puts forward a theory of evaluation that not only breaks with the utilitarianism
of neo-classical economics, it also disputes the approach of evaluation defended by
Rawls. Contrasting the work of the two thinkers, we observe that the relationship
between reality and values may be put together following two very different
approaches, which underpin two epistemologies of evaluation.
Two Relationships to Values
Sen is, it is well known, a fervent admirer of Rawls, but a rebellious one. He levels
two critics at the author of A Theory of Justice. Both critics are concerned with the
theory of evaluation presupposed by Rawls’ approach. The first, substantial and
widely noted, has to do with the ‘‘space of evaluation’’ (Sen 1992: 2f.), the yardstick
against which to assess equality. As people are different, writes Sen, ‘‘the
characteristics of inequality in different spaces (such as income, wealth, happiness,
etc.) tend to diverge from each other’’. A ‘‘space of evaluation’’ is thus centered
around a ‘‘focal variable’’ with which comparisons are made and inequalities
assessed. And here Sen suggests that the space of primary goods and resources,
championed by Rawls, should be replaced by that of capabilities. He argues that the
scales of worth cannot be balanced with only resources, be they symbolic or
material, because in any given situation, individuals may use resources in so many
different ways (Sen 1992). True equality is the equality of capabilities to lead a life
that one has reason to value. This critique opens up a new approach to justice (De
Munck and Zimmermann 2008).
Alongside this substantial critique, Sen develops a second, epistemological
critique, which is of interest to the discussion at hand. At its core, Rawls’s theory
promotes a certain understanding of what evaluation means. It methodologically
accounts for evaluations of justice thanks to the notions of ‘‘original position behind
a veil of ignorance’’ and of ‘‘reflective equilibrium between principles and
intuitions’’ (Rawls 2001: 29–32). Furthermore, the values discussed in A Theory of
Justice are carefully distinguished as ‘‘non-political’’. This distinction places an
entire field considered as pertaining to incommensurable ‘‘goods’’ outside the realm
of political evaluations.
Rawl’s epistemology reveals a monist and idealist construction of value. His
theory of justice projects the principles of a well-ordered society. Deduced from a
counterfactual situation of a veil of ignorance taken as a ‘‘thought experiment’’
(Rawls 2001: 37), these principles may be applied to any historical situation. Such
an approach requires no information about the real world and its actual possibilities.
What counts is reasoning about how a system of rights and duties that allows fair
social cooperation should be designed; reality is merely a matter of application. In
the political realm, Rawls’ approach exemplifies what idealist philosophy under-
stands as the ‘‘theory of value’’: a thorough ranking of axiological principles and
their consequences for individual choices.
Sen maintains that another approach is possible. Evaluative judgment may be
untangled from this ‘‘transcendental’’ perspective to account for relative,
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comparative, and contextual choices. There is thus no need for an absolute
benchmark to hold up against the shortcomings of reality. Rather, from all possible
worlds, the goal is to pick out the least bad options using a set of immanent values.
The very idea of a theory of value thus takes on new meaning. It can no longer be
expected to produce an order that is justified theoretically by reflexive thought,
which must then be held up against a varying and unstable reality. Instead, one must
seek heuristic principles that make it possible, from any given position, to determine
a method for producing solutions that are, in relative terms, better than others. The
distinction drawn by Rawls between the just and the good is no longer valid as an a
priori distinction that defines the limits of political impartiality. If this border
maintains any relevance, it is the provisional and unstable result of practical
judgment operating in a given situation.
The Critique of Rawls’ Monist and Deductive Approach
The debate over these two relationships to values is not new. It is recurrent in the
Western moral tradition: in a sense, Sen is to Rawls what Aristotle was to Plato or
Dewey was to Kant. To fully understand Sen’s objection to Rawls’s epistemology of
evaluation, it is important to follow his argumentation with regard to the
construction of Rawls’s theory of justice. In Sen’s eyes, A Theory of Justice suffers
from two fundamental epistemological weaknesses.
First, it maintains that rational individuals, debating in the strict epistemological
framework of the veil of ignorance, would, beyond a shadow of doubt, agree on the
two well-known principles put forward by Rawls. Principle (a) is that each person
has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. Principle (b) is that social and
economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. They must be attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and they
must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. (Rawls
1982: 161f.).
In reality, there is no reason that the outcome of an ascetic deliberation of the
kind imagined by Rawls would not preserve the relevance of multiple frameworks
for justice: ‘‘I have to express considerable skepticism,’’ admits Sen (2009: 56f.),
‘‘about Rawls’s highly specific claim about the unique choice, in the original
position, of one particular set of principles for just institutions, needed for a fully
just society’’. While it is true that the original position guarantees impartiality, it
does not impose an unequivocal choice of a set of values. The impartial citizens
imagined by Rawls will not be miraculously delivered from making the difficult
choice between a definition of equality based on need and one based on merit;
between a theory that prioritizes social utility and one that examines only individual
rights; between a negative idea of liberty and a positive one, etc. Faithful to the
epistemology upon which he models his theory, Rawls believes that reducing the
information base of deliberation processes guarantees decidability. But even so, the
original position leaves us faced with a variety of possible responses to the question
it claims to answer, which is, what is a just society?
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The second objection: the decision process leaves entirely open the problem of
how principles of justice are put into practice. Rawls prudently avoids all empirical
issues: he seeks only to build abstract rules capable of guiding fair institutional
choices. The question of real accomplishments that will be carried out in the context
of these institutions is not envisioned as a question of principle but rather as a
simple question of application. This simplification of social choice is not very
credible, however: ‘‘The idea that people will spontaneously do what they agreed to
do in the original position is Rawls’s own’’ (2009: 61). Indeed, even the most
cursory look at social and historical experience shows that this is untrue. The mere
existence of a social contract—even assuming it is shared by all—does not in any
way guarantee a just social order. A society’s choice of concrete institutions will
depend on the real behaviors of individuals (that is, on one or many political
cultures) and on the multiple consequences (due to social factors) of these
behaviors. A theory of justice cannot ignore the question of undesired effects of
institutional rules and practices. Sen is very attentive to this in his work: ‘‘the
inescapable relevance of actual behavior’’ (2009: 67) raises a consequentialist
question. This is true of moral relations among individuals, who cannot remain
indifferent to the impact of their decisions in the name of an ethical conviction that
knows nothing other than its own thought (Sen 2000). And it is even truer on the
level of collective and institutional choices, whose complexity is vast. What good
are theoretically just institutions if they lead to perverse and deviant behavior once
they are put to work?
These two critiques of Rawls’s approach do not call for a simple revision of his
theory; rather, they require a significant epistemological shift. Sen, inspired by the
theory of social choice, makes out of this shift the basis of his capability approach.
An Epistemological Shift
Sen builds his alternative to Rawls’s theory of evaluation on four principles.
First principle: plurality and comparison. We must abandon a monist theory that
restricts practical reasoning to a single scale of worth. There are many possible
frameworks for evaluation and there is no theoretical reason to curb this healthy
plurality. The question of what constitutes ‘‘quality work’’ is an excellent example
of this. Undeniably, it must be answered in terms of quality of work outcomes. But
political questions (discrimination, participation) and working conditions are just as
relevant, while the moral commitment of individuals to cooperate, which implies
loyalty and respect, is incontestably of crucial importance. Political philosophy has
often highlighted the variety of interests, but with few exceptions, (including
pragmatists like Dewey, as we shall see further on), it has rarely cared about the
plurality of evaluative frameworks.
But how can a judgment be formulated in the absence of a unified, coherent,
transcendent normative criterion? Sen provides an answer to this question with a
‘‘comparative’’ and ‘‘relational’’ method inspired by the theory of social choice,
rather than with a political philosophy that sets normative axioms that are supposed
to be indifferent to the contexts in which they are applied. Sen proposes instead that
different evaluative frameworks be compared, with attention to where they overlap
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and diverge. This comparison does not require any ‘‘transcendent’’ criterion that
would serve as a benchmark for comparison: when comparing a painting by Van
Gogh and one by Vermeer, we do not need a third model by Gauguin, or by some
kind of ideal or uber-painter, to decide on our preference. A judgment that one is
better than the other may be formed using immanent values. But, in so doing, we
must not imagine that we are ranking all possible cases according to a coherent
hierarchy. These rankings may remain incomplete without ceasing to be reasonable.
Thus the second principle: incompleteness. We should not expect an evaluative
theory to provide a complete ranking of values and norms for social choices. Rawls
gives a fairly good example of what such a complete theory would look like, one
with ‘‘no great fear of being accused of indecisiveness’’ according to Sen (2009: 89).
It offers a detailed ‘‘plan’’ for a well-ordered society (Rawls 2001: 8), from the
formulation of its principles to well-defined institutions. A theory sensitive to the
contingency of situations, by contrast, would limit itself to offering a framework for
democratic debate, and deliberately leave some of its propositions vague or
imprecise. In such a perspective, the theorist’s goal is not to propose structures and
rules for functioning, but rather to guide situated discussions. Sen reminds us that
‘‘the agreements arrived at need not demand that some proposal is uniquely just, but
only that it is plausibly just, or at least not manifestly unjust’’ (2009: 135).
Third principle: real accomplishments. Tellingly, Rawls’s theory of justice is
built without any empirical investigation of reality. Sen, on the other hand, gives
careful attention to functionings, ways of being, and doing in his capability
approach. Institutions are neither just nor fair in and of themselves—they are just
and fair only if they generate just and fair behaviors and realizations of value.
Values, therefore, ought to be examined in light of accomplishments, rather than
principles or rules. The principle of equality is not met by institutions distributing
resources according to just principles; it is met only if people actually have equal
capabilities of accomplishment at the end of the process. Between values and
accomplishments, between principles and behaviors, there are multiple and
empirically contingent conversion factors. Physical, cultural, and social factors
may explain the conversion (or lack thereof) of institutional good intentions into
effectively observable practices.
Through this principle of realism, contingency finds its place within the theory of
value: it may modify the supposed priority of the principles and lead to revisions in
value judgments. Hence the call for empirical social sciences: they may account for
causal mechanisms and unintended consequences. A discussion of values cannot be
separated from an account of the facts; here, as we shall see, Sen lines up with one
of the major intuitions of the pragmatist tradition, defended by thinkers from Dewey
(1916) to Putnam (2002).
Fourth principle: open deliberation. Value may be distinguished from simple
preference by a dimension of objectivity (understood in the sense of justifiability).
This search for objectivity implies that an evaluative process must include empirical
data and axiological parameters, discussed intersubjectively. Evaluation, in other
words, assumes deliberation: ‘‘The evaluation needed for the assessment of justice is
not just a solitary exercise but one that is inescapably discursive’’ (Sen 2009: 337).
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Democracy is the regime most suited to realizing this process of unrestricted
practical deliberation.
Like Rawls, Sen defines democracy not by the election of governors but by the
exercise of unrestrained deliberation to formulate social choices. Unlike Rawls,
however, he refuses to set theoretical limits to the public involved in these
discussions. He hews more closely to Smith’s theory of the ‘‘impartial spectator,’’
arguing in favor of including the greatest possible number of those concerned in the
public debate. Restricting those involved to a closed group of citizens poses two
major risks. First, it overlooks interdependencies that reach beyond the limits of pre-
identified publics. Second, this limitation runs the risk of unreflectively reproducing
local prejudices and particularities, whereas the gaze of a non-community member
might introduce a healthy distance from unquestioned traditions. Deliberation
should not involve only members of a group, but must include all opinions that can
foster ‘‘enlightenment relevance’’ in a given situation (Sen 2009: 132).
The Limits of this Shift
As we have seen, Sen affirms that continuity exists between expert and ordinary
judgment. The existence of this continuity never pushed him to develop a
comprehensive approach of situated judgments, however (Zimmermann 2006). The
author of The Idea of Justice never breaks with the intellectualism of experts. Even
when enlightened by deliberation, judgment, for him, remains that of individuals
defined by their intellectual insights, rather than their practical actions. It is as if the
international expert Amartya Sen were projecting the image of his own practice
onto social reality—a practice that takes place at a great distance from the
attachments and commitments of actual situations. We might nevertheless ask
ourselves where the criteria manipulated in evaluation come from, and how the
values upon which evaluation processes are built take shape. Of course, practical
judgment makes use of knowledge, more or less formalized methods and
measurements to build the objectivity required for justified decisions. But this
objectivity does not issue from the vacuum of a laboratory; it emerges in continuity
with ordinary practical judgments (pragmatic, ethical, and political), through a
reflective effort that is never separate from it. Intellectual evaluation implies
practical valuation. The conditions of this valuation interest the sociologist, who
sees in them the most elementary process by which socially shared values are
constituted. To account for this link between evaluation and valuation, we turn to
Dewey’s pragmatism.
(E)valuation and the ‘‘Logic of Judgments of Practice’’
Dewey’s approach to values may be seen as an extension of Sen’s, to which it
introduces new elements for discussion. Between the transcendental essentialist
account of values and the subjectivist one, Dewey clears a third path, that of
practice, which makes values the result of an active process of valuation that takes
shape in the interaction between persons and their environment. He thus invites us
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to approach evaluation as a judgment of practice, a matter of empirical inquiry, and
a case for deliberation.
From Values to Valuations
To demonstrate how Dewey shifts the discussion on values, we shall begin by
mapping out the concepts he elaborates in his Theory of Valuation (1939). As the
title suggests, his essay is concerned more with the formation, transformation, and
expression of values than with values in and of themselves.1 The emphasis on
valuation rather than values is by no means a play on words: it shifts the approach
from one that is strictly conceptual and abstract to one that is concerned with
concrete and active processes. By focusing on the verbal rather than the nominal
form of the term ‘‘value,’’ Dewey invites us to explore how values relate to agency
and practice, to human activity, to doing. To him, valuation is a certain kind of
human activity occurring in everyday life. He distinguishes between two variants of
this activity, prizing and appraising, which he argues are both radically different and
highly interwoven.
Prizing means valuing in the sense of esteeming, ‘‘of holding precious, dear’’.
Here, the ‘‘emphasis falls upon something having definite personal reference, which
(…) has an aspectual quality called emotional’’ (Dewey 1939: 195). Prizing is akin
to ‘‘value expression as ejaculatory’’ (1939: 196), to impulsion, and to instantaneous
appreciation. It is nurtured through routines, habits, personal sensibilities, needs,
and desires; it is intimately related to what people care for in the situation in which
their immediate experience occurs. Appraising, by contrast, means valuing in the
sense of estimating, ‘‘assigning value to’’ (Dewey 1939: 195). It is akin to an
activity of ranking, comparison, and critical judgment. It involves an examination of
the means involved and the consequences of action, and is dependent on the
practical conditions of a given situation. Appraising requires access to knowledge
and the implementation of cognitive procedures; indeed, knowledge and the
comparative processes it makes possible are the features that distinguish appraising
from prizing.
Appraising is primarily concerned with the assessment of the relational property
between different objects; to appraise is to make a judgment involving cognitive and
practical reasoning. Prizing, by contrast, expresses a relational property between an
object and a person; it names a practical, non-intellectual attitude. In the workplace,
for example, a line manager is supposed to use comparative and balanced reasoning
about the different elements of a given problem or situation to guide her assessment
of workers to determine the distribution of individual bonuses. In large and mid-
sized companies, different procedural tools are available to support this activity and
to collect the knowledge it requires (individual interviews, inquiry guides, grading
and weighting tools, etc.). Empirical evidence shows, however, that even in
companies where managers have access to many such tools, their evaluations of
their collaborators are not necessarily cold, comparative studies of hard facts, but
1 On this point, see the introduction of Bidet et al. (2011) to the French translation of the Theory of
Valuation.
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also involve elements rooted in personal prejudices or feelings. Spontaneous
classification of a worker by gender or ethnicity, the existence of personal affinities
(a shared passion for horseback riding, for example), or of affectionate relationships
between the manager and some of his subordinates introduce prizing into evaluation
processes as well, even though the distribution of wage bonuses is supposed to be
motivated by principles of justice such as merit and equity. This case illustrates the
interplay Dewey underscores between prizing and appraising in the process of
evaluation. The interconnectedness of these two concepts and the tensions that arise
from it are just as important as the heuristic distinction between them.
What we may at this stage retain from Dewey is that valuations are the result—
and possibly the resolution—of the tension between, on the one hand, what people
care for and are attached to, and on the other hand, the examination of rating and
assessment of facts and how they relate one to another. For Dewey, valuation is a
way of defining what is good, but he differentiates between what is good in itself;
that is, prized in the immediacy of experience, and what is good for; that is, oriented
toward the future and requiring the contradictory assessment of means and ends
(Dewey 1916: 29). He thus invites us to differentiate between finding or feeling
something is good and being able to justify or prove why and how it is good.
Valuing, in other words, is a matter of identifying what is good, whereas evaluation
is a matter of justification and proof, for it involves a judgment likely to be publicly
defended.
(E)valuation as Judgment of Practice
Dewey does more than simply delineate the semantic field of valuation; he also
provides us with concrete guidelines for studying evaluative judgments. Arguing
against the reductionism of strictly cognitive or formalist approaches, he empha-
sizes the double dimension, cognitive and practical, of evaluative judgments (Frega
2006). Because valuation is a judgment about doing something, Dewey invites us to
define evaluative judgments as ‘‘judgments of practice’’ (Dewey 1916), calling
attention to the relational aspects of taking action. Whereas Sen refers to a theory of
values grounded in reason, Dewey paves the way for a theory of valuation grounded
in practice. Both link evaluation to principles of plurality and comparison,
incompleteness, achievement, and deliberation, but the two thinkers address these
principles from different angles. Sen is most concerned with the procedural
dimension of evaluation, while Dewey seeks to highlight its concrete workings, and
to examine how its mechanisms actually shape normative agency in everyday life.
What does it mean to define evaluation as a judgment of practice? In ‘‘The Logic
of Judgments of Practice,’’ Dewey (1916: 16) identifies four ways in which practical
judgments2 are different from other forms of judgment, that provide meaningful
supports for social scientist to develop inquiries into evaluation. Practical judgments
are action-oriented, they involve valuation about desired outcomes, they entail a
means and end nexus, and they are grounded in empirical inquiry.
2 Dewey (1916) uses both expressions ‘‘judgments of practice’’ and ‘‘practical judgment’’
indiscriminately.
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A first critical difference between practical judgments and descriptive and
narrative statements is that, judgments of practice involve situations that demand
action; that is, situations that are incomplete or unfinished. This implies that the
proposition resulting from the valuation judgment ‘‘is itself a factor in the
completion of the situation, carrying it forward to its conclusion’’ (Dewey 1916:
16). If we agree with Dewey that evaluative judgments are geared toward action in
the future, then an evaluative judgment must integrate the future it anticipates, as
well as the fact that it is itself a determining factor in that future. For instance, when
a line manager tells workers that a production goal has not yet been reached, he
makes a descriptive statement. When he adds that they will therefore not receive any
wage bonus this time, he is formulating a practical judgment, hoping that this
sanction will push them to meet their goals in the future.
Second, ‘‘the subject-matter implies that it makes a difference how the given is
terminated: that one outcome is better than another and that the proposition is to be a
factor in securing (as far as may be) the better. In other words, there is something
objectively at stake in the forming of the proposition’’ (Dewey 1916: 17). As in
Sen’s principle of achievement, Dewey’s sense of practical judgment affects the
subject-matter (for better or worse), for it is a judgment about things to be done or
not. The line manager may also come to the conclusion that the production rates
demanded are too high to sustain without damaging workers’ health; that workers
cannot be blamed for this and that it might not help to cut down their wage bonuses,
right on the contrary; but that a solution, by contrast, might be hiring additional
employees and setting up night shifts.
Third, as shown by the previous example, practical judgment is concerned with
more than ends. It is fundamentally ‘‘binary’’ (Dewey 1916: 17), in that it involves
ends—results to be achieved—and means—how to achieve them—at the same time.
In any given situation, the projection of possible ends cannot be separated from the
means available. Practical judgment requires that both resources and constraints be
assessed, as well as possible ends according to available means. The amount of the
overall bonus package to be distributed and the possibility of actually organizing a
night team will affect the practical judgment made by the line manager as well as its
impact on workers and the production rate. By drawing attention to the nexus of
means and ends, Dewey warns us of two pitfalls, that of idealism oriented toward
ends but blind to means, and that of ‘‘mechanism,’’ strictly concerned with means
and lacking any vision of future outcomes. ‘‘Practical judgments do not therefore
primarily concern themselves with the value of objects, but with the course of action
demanded to carry an incomplete situation to its fulfillment’’ (1916: 31). This
reveals the nuance between Sen and Dewey’s understandings of incompleteness. As
we showed, Sen associates incompleteness with the plurality of values and the
partiality of comparison, making it an epistemological positive principle to be
secured procedurally. Dewey, on the other hand, promotes a broader understanding,
in which situations must be completed in order to be fulfilled. Doing so, he makes
incompleteness an empirical feature to be investigated, one that triggers empirical
inquiry. For Dewey, incompleteness involves the search for completeness, but not in
the sense of exhaustiveness: rather, in the sense of ‘‘adequacy as respects ends and
its means’’ (1916: 20).
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Such an understanding of incompleteness leads us to the fourth property of
judgments of practice, their grounding in empirical inquiry. ‘‘The judgment of what
is to be done implies (…) a statement of what the given facts of the situation are,
taken as indications of the course to pursue and of the means to be employed in its
pursuit’’ (Dewey 1916: 20). Evaluative judgments involve a logic of inquiry
intended to extend knowledge and produce empirical evidence about a given
situation and how to complete it. Along with this emphasis on the logic of inquiry,
Dewey introduces a distinction between judgment based on pre-established
principles—which he argues risks approaching human problems in terms of moral
approbation or condemnation such as ‘‘production goals have not been reached
because the workers are lazy and uncommitted’’– and logical judgment, which
demands that the ends be assessed according to the actual available means and
according to the different elements shaping a given situation. Reaching far beyond
the issue of practical judgment the logic of inquiry is a fulcrum of Dewey’s
approach.
(E)valuation as a Matter of Inquiry
The type of inquiry required for logical judgment is inquiry into situated action. As
the example of production rates shows, a decontextualized and disembodied rating
approach based on numbers and modeling alone is not sufficient to exercise an
evaluative judgment. Determining whether the production rate problem is one of
workers’ commitment and motivation or of line capacity requires an in-depth study
of the different factors affecting the production rate in a given work environment,
and of how these factors interact with one another.
When Dewey contends that value judgments, like any other object, are a
legitimate topic for pragmatist empirical inquiry, he is strongly rejecting the
dichotomy between values and facts (Putnam 2002), as well as between normative
and social inquiry (Dewey 1925; Festenstein 2001; Frega 2014). Along with A.
L. St. Clair (2007: 149), we may qualify Dewey’s pragmatist methodology as
‘‘viewing values entangled with empirical accounts of reality,’’ pointing ‘‘towards
the back and forth relations that occur between experiences, perceptions, theories[,]
and practices and between knowledge and action’’. This back and forth movement is
essential to judgment. Rather than reducing inquiry to a search for the empirical
foundations of evaluations, as any positivist approach would, it makes the very
process of inquiry into an integral dimension of the constitution of values through a
never-ending interplay and reciprocal shaping of knowledge and action.
Exercising one’s judgment means inquiring, and vice versa: it means elucidating
and producing meaning. However, far from being the exclusive domain of experts
and researchers, this process is a feature of ordinary agency. In correlation with the
practical and logical dimensions of judgment (assessing the ends according to the
means and conditions of a given situation), Dewey supports a consequentialist
conception of inquiry (1938), which requires methodological procedures capable of
putting facts, things, ideas, or desires to the critical test of lived experience. This
anchoring of evaluative judgments in experience is a cornerstone of Dewey’s
approach, and experience means interactions, be they with other humans, with
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objects, or with institutions—in short, with any elements that shape the ecology of
situated action. Experience and situations both arise from the interactions between
people and their environment. Evaluative judgments therefore involve both a
temporal dimension (connecting the present of situated action to the elements of the
past that affect it, as well as to its future outcomes) and a relational dimension
(linking environmental conditions to ends and means, persons and things). They
imply a reflective actor, capable of learning from the past and projecting himself,
and the others, into the future.
According to this consequentialist conception of inquiry, evaluative judgment is
a kind of critical activity. We make evaluative judgments through the critical
exercise of ordering the findings of inquiry (Dewey 1925: 295 ff). This is true for
legal judgments, for example, which do not merely implement normative principles,
but encompass a logic of inquiry into specific cases and situations, as well as the
ordering of the elements produced by this inquiry (Dewey 1924). This moment of
ordering involves deliberation.
(E)valuation as Deliberation
Let us return to Dewey’s distinction between prizing and appraising. The former can
be hasty and impulsive, whereas the latter requires us ‘‘to stop and think’’ (Dewey
1922: 197). Reason involves time and deliberation, defined as ‘‘an experiment in
finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like’’ (Dewey 1922:
190). ‘‘What is deliberation,’’ asks Dewey, ‘‘except [the] weighing of various
alternative desires (and hence end-values) in terms of the conditions that are the
means of their execution, and which, as means, determine the consequences actually
arrived at?’’ (1939: 213). Without deliberation, there is no evaluation, just impulsive
prizing. Deliberation is a condition for rational and reasonable stances (Dewey
1922: 196). The deliberative moment cannot be dissociated from the moment of
inquiry, however: the process of ordering is part of the inquiry, for the production of
data or facts can hardly be separated from the production of their meaning. Inquiring
therefore involves deliberating.
Weighing and ordering is a complicated moment in the process of valuation, for
it supposes that the options at hand will be reduced with regard to the means-end
nexus. Different evaluation outcomes may result from the deliberative process
depending how the end and means are framed in a given situation. For instance,
there is no conclusive answer to the question of what constitutes a valuable job: it
may vary among societies, individuals, and even different moments in the same life.
At a given stage of his working life a worker may value extended working hours
because they provide him access to experience, more money, career opportunities,
or simply because he loves his job. At another stage, the same worker may value
part-time work so he can spend more time with his children, on the novel he wants
to write, or on the junior football team he is training. This example shows the many
possible evaluations of what a good job might be and how they may be revised in
one and a same life course. This does not mean that values are relative, but rather
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that a given set of values is likely to be ranked differently depending on the practical
features of a given situation.
The deliberative method of confronting and ordering things is valid for
individuals as well as for groups, applicable to any problematic situation to be
completed: (e)valuation is a matter of individual as well as public inquiry. Dewey’s
thinking on the public as a community of participants concerned with a shared
problem (1927) substantially broadens Sen’s formal conception of public deliber-
ation, which is strangely lacking in any consideration of how a public might be
identified. By linking individual and public deliberation, Dewey connects the
construction of the deliberative subject to the practice of deliberative democracy. In
doing so, he ultimately places the process of value formation within the experience
of deliberative democracy.
Dewey’s approach, rooted as it is in the tension between prizing (esteeming) and
appraising (estimating), brings to the fore the concrete conditions for practical
judgment. At the same time, it proposes a model for building collective intelligence.
Although this is a stimulating approach for considering the question of evaluative
judgment, we see two limits to it. The first, already noted by D. Trom and J. Stavo-
Debauge (2004) lies in the irenic nature of participation: Dewey views participation
as a common good, without questioning its relevance and value for all participants.
The second relates to his focus on the ‘‘instituting’’ to the detriment of the
‘‘instituted’’. Celebration of imagination and reflexivity cannot mask the fact that
inherited normativity frames actors’ inquiries. Dewey is definitely aware of this:
when he discusses the way habits, impulses, and intelligence interfere with human
conduct (1922), he underlines the role of institutions in setting the conditions that
frame habits (1922: 20) or in securing positive freedom to act (1922: 166).
However, his understanding of institutions remains vague, encompassing habits,
organizations, law, trade-unions, and more; he sees them in terms of social
construction, formalization, and regularity.
Dewey’s interpretation of legal judgment offers insights that can help develop a
pragmatist understanding of institutions. For him, the law is an important
framework of evaluation. As he explained in ‘‘Logical Method and Law’’ (1924),
formalist and syllogistic legal reasoning are to be criticized; instead, pragmatism
should promote a consequentialist understanding of legal decisions. ‘‘Following a
legal rule’’ is not a matter of application alone. According to Dewey, a judge’s
deliberations must take into account legal norms, the values pertaining to a given
situation, and the constraints of reality. Legal reasoning is an inquiry that must
follow ‘‘a logic relative to consequences rather than antecedents’’ (1924: 26). While
this is an inspiring perspective on norms, it hardly provides a sufficient
understanding of institutions. We contend that in order to study (e)valuation as a
practical judgment, it is necessary to search for a clearcut empirical specification of
norms and institutions. That means making them objects of inquiry in and of
themselves, alongside individuals’ agency.
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Evaluation and Norms
Values and norms have two remarkable properties in common: normativity and
objectivity. As Pierre Livet puts it, ‘‘there is a difference between the substantive
‘norm’ and the qualifier ‘normative’. Clearly, norms are normative. But we might
argue that any value also has a ‘normative’ status […] Normativity is looser than a
norm, because it does not necessarily imply obligation or prohibition. Opinions,
advice, and even suggestions all have a normative aspect’’ (2006: 18). At the same
time, like norms, values are not purely subjective. As we emphasized above, this is
one way in which they must be distinguished from preferences. They claim to have
a certain degree of objectivity, and therefore of justification. And they may be
stabilized through intersubjective agreement.
Reconnecting Norms and Values
So what is the difference between norms and values? First, norms, either implicitly
or explicitly, impart obligations for those involved into an interaction. A proposal is
not a norm if it is not possible to define with a certain amount of precision what its
transgression means. Values relate to the action’s ends. They may imply obligations,
but not always, and not necessarily: they are often limited to evaluative judgments.
Norms have to do with what is obligatory or prescribed, while values relate to what
is desirable. To return to our example, productivity, security, equity, health, or well-
being are all values that may orient practical appreciations of work situations. The
norms of labor law, of work contracts, and of company rules set out obligations and
prohibitions in specific situations.
A second distinction between values and norms has to do with the relationship
between concrete action and its motivation. In the case of a norm, sanctions and
incentives orient behavior. In this sense, it may be said that norms motivate ‘‘from
the outside,’’ even if, as Parsons suggested in his reading of Freud, ‘‘external’’
constraints and related sanctions may be ‘‘internalized’’ by actors. Sanctions may be
positive or negative: they may take the form of material and symbolic forms of
recognition or punishment, as well as expressions of contempt that are more or less
institutionalized by a social group. Value, on the other hand, does not come with
these kinds of control apparatus. It is not supposed to control behavior from the
outside, but rather to motivate from within, with internal ends. In the case of value,
the actor is expected not to conform, but to adhere, to commit, to put forth effort.
The similarities and differences between norms and values have sparked intense
debate in the social sciences. In his functionalist theory of society, Parsons (Bohman
1991: 30–40) proposed a kind of ranking from the most general to the most specific.
In a descending motion of specification, cultural values shared within a society take
shape as norms for interaction; these norms, internalized by those interacting in
regulated role-plays, ultimately modulate actors’ preferences, preventing them from
being purely chaotic and unpredictable. This majestic construction is no longer
acceptable in a pragmatist framework. The variety of possible valuations makes
such theoretical coherence of values that might coordinate actors’ orientations
before they act, impossible.
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Other currents in the social sciences have sought to assimilate values with norms,
or vice versa. Rational choice theories have a marked tendency to confuse norms
and values, and to reduce norms to instances of control. This is notably the case for
James Coleman, who establishes a theory of norms in which values disappear
completely: there are only private and individual preferences, while norms are the
expression of powerful groups (Joas 2000: 14f.). Sen and Dewey sometimes
differentiate between norms and values (Dewey does so, for example, in his
discussion of moral judgment in 1930).3 But the difference is often blurred and is
not a cornerstone of their approach; both seem to assume that the link between
norms and values is simple and fluid.
From the pragmatist perspective, (e)valuative deliberation must lay out both
differences and similarities between norms and values. It might of course be said
that values can justify norms (or systems of norms). This is the case, for example,
when a legislative norm regarding working hours is justified by the values of
solidarity and of pooling available work. But in certain situations, a system of norms
may also justify a value judgment (Livet 2006: 40): before a labor court, for
example, legal norms may provide sufficient basis for upholding or condemning a
behavior. Norms should not therefore be founded in values, nor values in norms, but
rather considered as two buttresses for evaluative judgments.
The principle of incompleteness we applied to evaluations must be extended to
norms. The latter may be considered as obligations defined at the confluence of
multiple spaces of evaluation. They do not suppose ultimate justifications within a
theory of goodness or justice. In his defense of ‘‘incompletely theorized’’ legal
decisions, Cass Sunstein (1995) notes that numerous legal norms demonstrate only
partial justifications. Reasoning does not make reference—contrary to what
Dworkin (1986) presupposes in his analysis of judicial reasoning—to profound
theories shared by all, but rather to small-scale, modest theories. Is worker
subordination a matter of class domination or a form of contractual freedom? Labor
law takes no position with regard to these two ‘‘profound’’ interpretations. It limits
itself to establishing an ad hoc doctrine that allows actors to maintain their
‘‘profound’’ interpretations, and at the same time creates a theoretical space for
partial compromise. It formulates norms that must be interpreted by judges who
activate values in a given situation.
On the one hand, norms are on the horizon of evaluations, as their possible
outcome. Although valuations are made with regard to specific situations, they may
repeat themselves; and crystallize into controls and obligations. Conversely, if
norms do not frame future mutual expectations about behavior, then values, in many
cases have no chance of stabilizing into concrete social realities. For instance, what
good is extolling the value of solidarity through work sharing if no norm exists to
sanction businesses that take advantage of initiatives to reduce working hours and/or
salaries for the sole sake of their profit and to the detriment of job creation? On the
other hand, already existing norms constrain deliberation: they bear witness to
previous deliberations, and require that the present be linked to the past; they
express necessities from other contemporary situations of action, raising the issue of
3 We thank Roberto Frega for drawing our attention to this reference.
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how they should be included in a more general framework. As horizons and as
constraints, norms introduce temporality into evaluations and shape them as
learning processes.
As we have seen, norms and values are both constitutive of evaluative judgment.
But, as Dewey has shown, evaluation takes place in specific circumstances: the
question is what must be done here and now, given the actual state of the world.
Practical possibilities in a given situation are not generated by applying norms, nor
by invoking values: they result from a logic of inquiry whose central role Dewey has
demonstrated. Inquiries are not made solely into the state of the world, but also into
the specific alternatives of the actors involved and the way they relate to a given
environment. They look into actual situations, and into their potentialities, as well.
Evaluation therefore requires an indexing procedure that is never fully exhausted in
the reflective game of norms and values. Alongside axiological aims and normative
compliance, practical evaluation must confront a third core element: the principle of
relevance. Balancing means, norms, and ends implies situated, informed judgment,
which, when lacking, may lead to an action’s failure. Whether an action fits or not
depends on the material, symbolic, and institutional foundations that make its
accomplishment possible. Each in his own way, Sen and Dewey convince us that no
theory of evaluation can ignore the vital relationship of evaluation with the various
elements that shape actors’ capabilities and achievements.
The Evaluation of Work
Evaluation in the workplace offers a perfect illustration of the process linking
values, norms, and situations. For the past 15 years, an abundant literature has
emerged that underscores the shortcomings and pathologies affecting work
evaluation (Dejours 2003; Clot 2010). These shortcomings bear testament to the
way evaluation has been dismantled into the three component parts (values, norms,
and situations) identified above. Let us take the case of the (e)valuation of good
work or quality work.
Work takes place within a highly normative environment. Labor legislation sets
the standards for work conditions and industrial relations, while organizational
prescriptions set the standards for work processes and outcomes. An important part
of work evaluation, therefore, examines whether and how norms are being
respected. Among the evaluations whose subject is norms, we shall distinguish
between those that focus on work processes and those that focus on work outcomes.
In the case of process-based evaluations, work is identified as a set of rules that
employees must follow. Good work, in this context, must correspond as closely as
possible to prescribed standards, and doing one’s job consists in respecting
instructions. Work evaluation is then based on a de-personalization of job
performance; it values discipline within a strict division of labor that sharply
delineates planning from execution. Rooted in the industrial, planned model of
production (Salais and Storper 1997) and characteristic of Taylorist work
organization, it is still broadly applied, and has now expanded to the service
sector, as illustrated by the scripts telephone workers must follow.
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Although the Taylorist model for prescribed work is the first one that comes to
mind when thinking about norm-based work evaluation, the goal-based model of
evaluation, which has become increasingly widespread across sectors and occupa-
tions over the past few years, is norm-based as well. It focuses on work outcomes
and performance, rather than processes. Once reserved for management and
planning engineers, management by objective has been extended to all categories of
employees. It assesses the performance of each employee with regard to quantitative
and qualitative goals that are, theoretically, agreed upon during an annual evaluation
meeting between the employee and her manager. This kind of evaluation focuses on
the outcome of work in terms of productivity and performance, with little regard for
the means used to achieve them. Paradoxically, this kind of evaluation basically
ignores the actual activity of working, and often leaves workers in the situation of
having to do more with less. Empirical evidence shows that in reality, goals are
seldom discussed; rather, they are imposed unilaterally on employees, which makes
the end and means nexus problematic for them, as they have no control over how the
terms of either one are set (Zimmermann 2014).
Observed critically, objective-driven evaluation combines a norm-based princi-
ple of evaluation (valuing the achievement of goals, set as norms to be met,
whatever the situation) with a creativity-based principle (valuing the workers’
capability to act in a way that best suits the situation and to face unforeseen events
in order to meet the goals). The competent and flexible worker (Zimmermann 2004)
and the virtuoso or key performer (Dodier 1995) are reference points for this latter
principle, which places the person and the situation—that is, situated work—at its
heart.
The tensions that arise from the combination of these two principles of
evaluation, combining the valuation of the respect of norms on the one hand and of
the worker’s capability to adjust their action to the specificity of the situation on the
other, reveal the different values of work underpinning these principles. Norm-
based evaluation arises from an economic understanding of work as oriented
towards the production of market value, while creativity-based evaluation is rooted
in an anthropological conception of work as oriented towards human accomplish-
ment. Depending on which of these two points of view is emphazised, the
understanding of what quality work might be differs greatly. From an economic
perspective, the quality of work depends on the market value of its performance or
product. From a human perspective, the quality of work depends on individual skill,
know-how, and talent, but also, what companies often disregard, on the quality of
employment and working conditions; that is on the quality of the work environment
provided by the employer. Employment conditions (type of job contract, work hours
and schedule, pay, benefits, etc.) affect the security of employees’ life courses and
how much control, if any, they have over their present and their future. Working
conditions are just as important, affecting workers’ physical and mental health, as
well as their work experience in general. The quality of working conditions depends
on the means actually available for performing the work in a satisfactory manner,
without pressuring employees to achieve goals that are disproportionate to the
technical, material, and human resources at their disposal. Quality work also
extends to enjoyment of a job well done (Sennett 2008). When productivity and
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performance imperatives, time pressures, contradictory instructions, or inadequate
resources impede that enjoyment, the worker’s own valuation of good work is at
odds with the one imposed on him by his employer.
The plurality of values and ways of appraising the quality of work in the workplace
is not problematic in itself, but it becomes problematic when different valuations of
good work coexist mutely without any opportunity or space to debate them publicly.
Competing valuations of work are representative of the multifaceted nature of people in
the workplace: producers of economic value, creative and social beings at the same
time. To return to Dewey, what lacks at the company level is a space for deliberation in
which the different stakeholders—employers and employees together—can voice what
quality work means to them, in terms of end and means. This internal space for
deliberation should, furthermore, exist within a broader space that includes external
stakeholders, such as consumers or local citizens, as a company’s activity necessarily
affects its geographic and social environment. Only by strengthening and improving
situated democratic debate and worker participation in the workplace can we hope to
progress in the process of reconciling work values rooted in economic as well as human
development. Following Sen and his plea in favor of involving non-directly concerned
actors (Smith’s impartial spectator) or introducing Mead’s idea of a generalized other in
a pragmatist perspective, one might even consider including a third circle of
deliberating actors, such as nongovernmental organizations like Human Rights Watch.
If deliberation is necessary, it is not sufficient, however. It makes it possible to
share knowledge as well as dissenting views or evaluations; but deliberation has
only minimal practical impact if judgments of practice are not translated into
practical decisions and conclusions. Therefore the inquiry into valuations needs to
be completed by an inquiry into institutional procedures that make work a subject of
public and democratic debate, as well as into procedures governing decision-making
on work issues at different levels (company, sector, territory).
This example shows the advantage of evaluation studies that implement Sen’s
principle of plurality, incompleteness, achievement, and deliberation alongside
Dewey’s account of evaluation as situated practical judgment engaging a means and
ends nexus. Firstly, awareness of the plurality and incompleteness of (e)valuations
helps to avoid a reductionist understanding of evaluation as a sole matter of
adequacy between prescribed norms and outcomes. Instead, identifying the plurality
of valuations competing to define what good work means becomes an object of
inquiry on its own. Such an approach highlights the tensions between norms and
values in which work and workers are embedded. The guiding principles of
evaluation within a company partially result of the way these tensions are dealt with.
Secondly, dealing with plurality is not merely a matter of procedure (deliberation):
it is also a matter of agreeing on valuable achievements. Here, Sen’s concern for
justice takes center stage (2009): he invites us to consider how principles of justice
can aim at different achievements and should be linked to other principles, such as
economic efficiency at the company level. To use Dewey’s words, one should
investigate here the way the right and the good combine.4 Thirdly, Dewey’s account
4 Dewey makes out of the search for such a combination, which doesn’t work without tensions, a core
dimension of the moral experience (1930).
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of evaluation as judgment of practice offers a methodological guideline for the
empirical study of how principles of justice unfold in concrete cases. Such
analyses should deal with the formulation of judgments in concrete situations of
action involving desired achievements and issues of adequacy between means and
ends.
The inquiry grid that emerges from such an approach focuses on persons, their
environment taken at large, and the situations of action that result from their
interactions (Zimmermann 2006). Although practical judgment is often reduced to
the question of situated action, devoting attention to the environment requires a
multiscale analysis that looks not just at individual biographies and specific
situations, but also beyond at the environmental features of organizational and
institutional settings, at the kind of resources or constraints they display for situated
action. Furthermore, such multiscale analysis must be symmetrical in the sense that
David Bloor uses the term (Bloor 1991 [1976]), meaning that the analysis must
develop an understanding of the points of view and judgments of all the people
involved in the evaluation, whatever their role and position in the process.
Symmetry accounts for plurality within the methodological framework, making it
possible to compare and contrast competing valuations, and their possible
contradictions and tensions and to use them as a critical lever for analysis. Finally,
this multiscale analysis asks for the conditions of a cognitive informed deliberation,
making it possible for all different stakeholders to voice their concerns and make
them count. One of its aims is to test this deliberative principle, a key condition of
evaluation as practical judgment, against reality.
Conclusion
Our joint exploration of Sen and Dewey’s approaches paves the way for a
pragmatist and institutionalist account of evaluation. Considering evaluation as a
practical judgment, and the latter as an inquiry requires that we avoid reducing it to
the performance of a natural skill. Rather, practical judgment is a capability in the
fully pragmatist sense of that term. In Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics,
Dewey makes the following distinction between capacity and capability: a person’s
capacity refers to her abilities and aptitudes, while capability describes the
interaction between this capacity and a given environment, which ‘‘means special
station, situation, limitations, surroundings, opportunities, etc.’’ (1957: 97).
Capability is therefore virtual agency, the result of an individual’s intersection
with his environment.
The capability for practical judgment is partly dependent on nature, as neurology
and psychology studies have explored. But it is partly constituted in a social world,
too, shaped by cognitive and practical resources as well as factors allowing their
conversion into assessments. The normative dimension of practical judgment tells
us that it should be plural, incomplete, outcome-oriented, and deliberative. This is,
of course, not always the case, and sociologists must take environmental conditions
into account and consider differences among environments that do or do not enable
‘‘publics’’ to be constituted and capabilities for deliberative evaluation to be
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developed. Addressed from the angle of resources and conversion factors, the
capability for practical judgment unavoidably raises the issue of power in a given
environment: in the sense of power to act, as well as in the political sense of power
relations. The shaping of the capability for practical judgment is tied to the issue of
power in multiple ways.
On the one hand, cultural repertoires, shared presuppositions, and inherited
categories are all resources for or constraints to judgment, and these resources are
not evenly distributed among actors. They may be more or less abundant, more or
less relevant, or more or less critical. Differences in gender, class, or ethnic features
may change the conditions of (e)valuation and for sharing these (e)valuations with
other people engaged in the same course of action. Provided with the same
information, different people with different cognitive and political capabilities may
produce different judgments.
On the other hand, institutions (firms, schools, governments, etc.) produce a
certain degree of formalization of power relations. Formalization has important
effects on people’s capability for practical judgment, in that it binds individuals one
to another through instituted roles, positions, and legitimized systems of authority.
In other words, institutions’ political organization strongly affects individuals’
capabilities for (e)valuation.
Taking into account power relations leads us to consider institutions both as
constitutive of and resulting from collective processes of (e)valuation. Institutions
may be distinguished according to the design and setting of (e)valuation they foster:
some may be open to a plurality of spaces of (e)valuation and follow more or less
democratic procedures, while others limit spaces of (e)valuation and occasions to
deliberate. All institutions do not enable the development of people’s capabilities of
judgment: information disclosure, the organization of deliberative settings, and the
distribution of knowledge are all important means to enhance the capability for
practical judgment. These considerations lead towards a critical inquiry into
institutions taking into account their multiple facets, at the same time constraining
and enabling.
Focusing on the relationship among capabilities, institutions, and power relations
offers the point of departure for a political account of the formation of practical
judgment, for which Sen and Dewey provide coherent foundations. In order to
enhance the pragmatist approach of normative action, their respective approaches
must, however, be broadened into a more consistent institutionalist perspective.
Both Sen and Dewey are looking to expand democracy, yet democracy depends on
institutional designs. This is why the emerging ‘‘discipline’’ of (e)valuation must
tackle political issues head-on. These issues, however, cannot be solved through
conceptual reasoning alone; they demand fresh inquiry into capabilities for practical
judgment in concrete situations. Starting with the examples from the workplace
developed in this article, we may identify three transversal questions that call for a
deeper investigation of how institutions affect evaluations. The first question is,
‘‘who is evaluating?’’. Publics are not spontaneously generated from a void:
institutions can encourage or discourage their constitution, as well as influence their
boarders. The second question is, ‘‘what is the relationship between evaluative
deliberation and the actual power to act on real things?’’. Finally, the last question
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pertains to the authority and legitimacy of both evaluators and evaluations. In order
to build a fully operational theory of evaluation as practical judgment, these
questions need to be tackled. The resulting approach thus aims to investigate
evaluation at the cross-road between a sociology of knowledge and a political
sociology revisited through the lens of situated agency.
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